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Abstract 
How do international investors react to announcements of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (CM&As) by emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs)? 
Using a unique and manually-constructed ﬁrm-level dataset, this paper examines the 
stock price reactions to CM&A announcements made over the period 1991 - 2010 by 
Chinese MNEs listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the wealth impacts of 
their corporate governance. Our empirical ﬁndings conﬁrm a positive stock price 
reaction on average, and suggest that international investors react positively to the 
presence of large shareholders, but negatively to the presence of institutional 
shareholders. There is a negative impact if the largest shareholder is either the State or 
the corporate founder. We suggest that this is because the international investors 
perceive potential principal - principal conﬂicts in such ownership/control 
constellations and discount equity prices accordingly. We also ﬁnd that Board size 
and independence have positive effects on the price reaction, but that large 
supervisory boards engender negative reactions. 
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1. Introduction 
The last decade has witnessed a remarkable surge of outward foreign direct 
investment (OFDI) from developing economies. Whilst FDI outﬂows from developed 
countries declined during and after the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2008, the 
developing economies’ share of the world’s FDI ﬂows continued to rise, surging from 
13.5% in 2007 to 24.8% by 2011 (UNCTAD, 2011). One of the primary 
internationalisation modes for developing country ﬁrms has been cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (CM&As) (Bhagat, Malhotra, & Zhu, 2011). The share of 
the world’s CM&As made by ﬁrms from developing countries nearly doubled from 
15% in 2005 to 29% in 2010 (UNCTAD, 2011). In particular, CM&As are the 
dominant internationalization mode for Chinese ﬁrms (Sun, Peng, Ren, & Yan, 2012). 
 
There is a considerable literature investigating the impact of foreign acquisitions by 
listed companies upon shareholder wealth, and the determinants of the size of that 
impact. Most of these empirical studies use data for multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
from the United States or other developed economies, and there are few that focus on 
multinationals from developing and/or emerging economies (EMNEs). But there are 
good reasons to suspect that the impact determinants will differ for EMNEs, both 
because of their different ownership and/or control characteristics and because of the 
weaker corporate governance and investor protection regimes in their home countries. 
CM&As are critical strategic decisions that are made by executives (agents) under the 
supervision of Boards of Directors on behalf of the shareholders (principles). In 
emerging market economies, formal institutions and external governance mechanisms 
to protect property rights are often weak or absent, so shareholder concentration is 
common in order to reduce agent discretion and principal–agent (PA) conﬂicts 
(Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002). However, such shareholding 
concentrations may also give rise to principal–principal (PP) conﬂicts whereby 
controlling shareholders are minded to expropriate the interests of minority 
shareholders (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 
2000). 
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EMNEs can take action to offset the weakness of their governance systems at home 
by internationalising, such as via cross-listing in developed countries to ‘‘bond’’ to 
better legal and regulatory regimes (Coffee, 1999; Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2004; 
Reese & Weisbach, 2002; Stulz, 1999). Indeed, it has been suggested that EMNEs 
incorporated or cross-listed in developed countries should have a lower risk of 
information asymmetry and a higher ﬁrm value than their domestic counterparts 
(Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2003; Sami & Zhou, 2008). In this paper, we investigate the 
shareholder wealth effects in a sample of 335 acquisitions made by Chinese MNEs 
over the period 1991–2010. A novelty is that we limit our sample to Chinese MNEs 
that are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE). The HKSE adopts 
international rules for ﬁnancial reporting, and these are much stricter than in China. 
The HKSE-listed companies are thus committed to higher disclosure standards than in 
the domestic Chinese market. Furthermore, domestic Chinese investors are restricted 
from trading H-shares or investing in Chinese ﬁrms incorporate in Hong Kong, hence 
we will be assessing the reaction of international investors to the CM&A 
announcements. Such international investors may be assumed to have many potential 
investment opportunities, and moreover to have the means and expertise to make 
relatively balanced judgments of the merits of individual CM&A deals. We 
hypothesise that several dimensions of ownership structure and corporate control, and 
various internal control mechanisms, should have an impact upon the stock market 
reactions by international investors to announcements of CM&As. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. We ﬁrst develop our hypotheses in the light of 
recent theoretical and empirical work on CM&As. In the following section, we 
provide a detailed description of the dataset and outline the event study methodology 
to be used to assess the stock market reactions to the CM&A announcements. We 
then report our research results ﬁrst on shareholder value creation and secondly on the 
relationships between shareholder returns and corporate governance. The last section 
concludes the paper. 
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2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1. The stock market reaction to announcements of cross-border acquisitions 
Both internalisation theory and the resource-based view suggest that ﬁrms 
undertaking FDI must possess some ownership (ﬁrm-speciﬁc) advantages that not 
only permit them to be competitive in their home markets, but also allows them to 
offset the additional costs associated with operating in an overseas market (Zaheer, 
1995). The markets for such intermediate products (semi-processed materials, 
together with various types of knowledge and expertise embodied in human capital 
and other intangible assets) are typically imperfect, so that FDI is preferred  to arm’s 
length contractual arrangements (e.g. licensing) (Buckley & Strange, 2010). 
Furthermore, FDI may also allow ﬁrms to diversify risks and stabilise earnings, 
because market returns in different geographical areas often show low correlation. It 
follows that ﬁrms will undertake FDI if future synergistic beneﬁts are envisaged and, 
to the extent that this judgment is shared by investors and markets are efﬁcient (in that 
prices reﬂect all available information), the share price of the investing ﬁrm should 
rise on the announcement of the FDI project to reﬂect this expectation – there will be 
‘value creation’. This rise in the share price should be evident whether the FDI takes 
the form of a greenﬁeld venture or the (full or partial) acquisition of a target ﬁrm in 
the overseas host economy. When the FDI takes the form of an acquisition, it is 
reasonable to assume that the investing ﬁrm will transfer some knowledge and 
expertise to or from the target ﬁrm – unless the investment is made purely and simply 
for the purposes of a ﬁnancial return–and that some of the potential gain from the FDI 
project will be reﬂected in a premium paid for the shares of the acquiring ﬁrm (Meyer, 
Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009). If the acquirers are listed, then its share price should 
thus rise on the announcement of the FDI project as information about the acquisition 
is made public. This stock market reaction can be assessed either as the abnormal 
return (AR) on the day of the announcement, or as a cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) over an ‘event window’ around the day of the announcement1. 
                                                          
1 See Section 3 for further explanation. 
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Now the stock markets may have a more sceptical view of the potential synergies 
from the foreign acquisition2, and may not have conﬁdence in the ﬁrm’s strategy, the 
timing of the FDI project, or the management’s ability to implement the project 
successfully (Woolridge & Snow, 1990; Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath, & Pisano, 2004). 
It is well-known that many acquisitions, both domestic and cross-border, do not 
realise the expected synergies either because the integration process proves more 
difﬁcult or more protracted than expected, or because there were surplus assets and 
capabilities (including labour) than were costly to release (Shimizu et al., 2004). 
Moreover, investors may question whether the managers of the acquirer ﬁrm make 
rational and objective decisions based upon the risks and potential gains from the FDI 
project, whether they overpay for target ﬁrms because of hubris, or mould ﬁrm 
strategy to their own objectives (Seth, Song, & Pettit, 2000). Such scepticism will be 
reﬂected in a reduced (possibly even negative) share price reaction for the acquiring 
ﬁrm, the target ﬁrm, or both. 
 
There is a considerable empirical literature focusing on the short- run stock reactions 
of acquirer ﬁrms to announcements of cross- border acquisitions3: see, for example, 
(Doukas & Travlos, 1988; Conn & Connell, 1990; Morck & Yeung, 1992; Kang, 
1993; Markides & Ittner, 1994; Datta & Puia, 1995; Cakici, Hessel, & Tandon, 1996; 
Conn, Cosh, Guest, & Hughes, 2005; Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005; Doukas & Kan, 
2006; Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Feito-Ruiz & Mene´ndez-Requejo, 2009; Chari, Ouimet, 
& Tesar, 2010; Von-Eije & Wiegerinck, 2010). Most of these studies have used data 
on US or other developed economy ﬁrms, and few strong conclusions may be drawn: 
some studies report an average share price reaction that is positive and statistically 
signiﬁcant; some a reaction that is negative and statistically signiﬁcant; and others 
ﬁnd evidence that is inconclusive. There are a limited number of studies of CM&As 
by EMNEs, and again the results are mixed. For example Aybar and Ficici (2009) 
                                                          
2 There is a range of research that has discussed the general beneﬁts of CM&As. Shimizu et al. (2004) 
proposed three perspectives in understanding CM&As based on the previous literature: CM&As as an 
international entry mode, learning opportunities of a foreign culture, and a value creation strategy. 
Additionally, Sun et al. (2012) provides the additional view that CM&As allows MNEs to continue 
enjoying national industrial factor endowments, as well as a reconﬁguration of their value chain and 
facilitation to overcome institutional constraints. Value creation has been the key perspective in the 
literature. This paper examines the value creation implications of EMNEs’ corporate governance. 
3 This  literature  appears  in  both  IB  and  ﬁnance  journals,  and  different terminology is often used 
for the same concepts. 
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reported an average negative stock market responses to CM&A announcements by a 
sample of EMNEs from 11 countries, whereas Bhagat et al. (2011) found a signiﬁcant 
positive market reaction to announcements in a sample of EMNEs from eight 
emerging markets. Chen and Young (2010) showed that Chinese acquiring MNEs 
have negative average CARs, whereas Boateng, Qian, & Tianle (2008) and Kling and 
Weitzel (2011) showed positive CARs for their samples of Chinese ﬁrms4. 
 
[Insert Fig. 1 around here] 
 
This study focuses on a sample of EMNEs that have cross-listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange (HKSE). Previous research (Coffee, 1999; Lang et al., 2003; Stulz, 
1999) has suggested that ﬁrms that have cross-listed in advanced markets can reduce 
agency and capital costs by signalling their commitment to comply with the 
regulatory requirements of the host countries with better investor protection (the so-
called bonding hypothesis). Doidge et al. (2004) found that foreign ﬁrms cross-listed 
in the United States had higher ﬁrm valuations, as measured by Tobin’s q. Sami and 
Zhou (2008) identiﬁed 73 Chinese ﬁrms cross-listed on the HKSE, and reported that 
they had lower information asymmetry risks, lower capital costs, and higher ﬁrm 
values (measured by Tobin’s q) than their domestic counterparts. This they ascribed 
to the increased disclosure and regulatory scrutiny. We therefore hypothesise: 
H1. The average stock market reaction to cross-border acquisitions by EMNEs will 
be positive. 
                                                          
4 In more detail, Aybar and Ficici (2009) analysed 433 CM&A announcements made by 58 EMNEs 
during the 1991–2004 period, and showed that equity market responses are negative on average to 
CM&A announcements by EMNEs in 11 countries. Chen and Young (2010) studied 39 deals by 32 
Chinese MNEs from 2000 to 2008 and showed Chinese acquiring MNEs have negative average CARs 
and those with greater government ownership generate lower value returns in CM&As. In contrast, 
Bhagat et al. (2011) show a signiﬁcant positive market reaction based on an analysis of 698 CM&A 
announcements by EMNEs from eight emerging markets from 1991 to 2008. Gubbi et al. (2010) 
showed that CM&As create signiﬁcant positive shareholder value for Indian acquiring MNEs using an 
event study of 425 acquisitions during 2000 - 2007. Kohli and Mann (2012) study a sample of 202 
CM&As and 66 domestic M&As, concluding that the former generate superior wealth gains than the 
latter in India. Boateng et al. (2008) examined a small sample of 27 Chinese CM&As in a short period 
between 2000 and 2004 and saw positive value creation for acquiring ﬁrms’ shareholders. Kling and 
Weitzel (2011) analysed 221 CM&A announcement events of Chinese ﬁrms listed in the Hong Kong, 
Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges between 2001 and 2008 and concluded that CM&As created 
positive shareholder value but to a lesser extent than domestic M&As. 
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2.2. Corporate governance determinants of the stock market reaction 
The extant literature on the determinants of shareholder wealth effects in CM&As by 
EMNEs reviewed above focuses primarily on ﬁrm-speciﬁc and/or bid-speciﬁc 
characteristics, together with country and/or institutional determinants. Few of the 
studies considered governance variables, either at the national or company level. 
Bhagat et al. (2011) showed that country-speciﬁc governance provisions related to 
investor protection had a signiﬁcant positive impact upon shareholder gains. Kling 
and Weitzel (2011) considered the domestic stock market impact of a small number of 
ﬁrm-speciﬁc ownership variables in the context of the internationalization of Chinese 
ﬁrms, whilst Chen and Young (2010) found that large government ownership had a 
negative impact upon domestic shareholder returns from Chinese CM&As. This 
research builds upon and extends this line of research. We conjecture that corporate 
governance variables – and, in particular, variables related to ownership structure, 
corporate control, and various internal control mechanisms – will affect the size of the 
stock market reaction to CM&A announcements. The emerging economy context is 
important in this regard, as it is here that principal–agent (PA) and principal–principal 
(PP) problems are potentially crucial. 
 
The PA perspective argues that agent discretion is likely to surge due to discrepancies 
in both information and specialised, localised knowledge between shareholders 
(principals) and managers (agents). Monitoring and supervision can be particularly 
difﬁcult and costly. Value creation derived from internationalisation might be 
compromised by managerial entrenchment when managers attempt to pursue their 
personal interests through internationalisation such as hubris and ‘‘empire building’’ 
behaviours (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998; Seth, Song, & Pettit, 2002). In contrast, the 
principal–principal (PP) perspective focuses on the conﬂicts between controlling and 
minority principal shareholders (Lien, Piesse, Strange, & Filatotchev, 2005). It 
postulates that ownership and control concentration (blockholders) may reduce 
information asymmetry and free rider issues related to monitoring in ﬁrms with 
widely-dispersed shareholdings (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). However, the majority 
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shareholders might attempt to reap the private beneﬁt of control derived from this 
concentrated owner- ship structure and disregard the interest of minority principals. 
This goal and interest incongruence between the majority and minority principals can 
eventually lead to PP conﬂicts5. Fig. 1 provides an illustration of the layout of our 
hypotheses. 
 
2.2.1. Ownership structure 
To study the PP conﬂicts that affect EMNEs shareholder returns when engaging in 
CM&As, we ﬁrst examine the ownership structure, which is an important governance 
mechanism inﬂuencing a ﬁrm’s strategic decision-making and shareholder value 
creation, and aligns the interests of stakeholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997). In emerging economies, a concentrated ownership structure is very 
common among publicly-listed ﬁrms, often due to an absence of effective legal 
protection of minority shareholders and external governance mechanisms such as 
product market competition, the managerial labour market, and the threat of takeovers 
(La Porta, Lopez-de- Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997; Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2007; 
Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988). 
 
Given the weak governance and underdeveloped institutional context to minority 
shareholder protection, shareholder concentration is a rational strategy to monitor and 
reduce managerial discretion (Dharwadkar et al., 2000). This could minimise the 
agency costs arising from the PA conﬂicts, as the controlling shareholder with the 
largest shareholding is incentivized to collect information, monitor managers as well 
as bear the risks of pursuing new business ventures. Their signiﬁcant voting powers as 
a result of their largest shareholding also give them the ability to ensure managers 
make investment decisions in the interest of shareholders (La Porta, Lo´ pez de 
Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). We therefore hypothesise: 
 
H2a. The stock market reaction to cross-border acquisitions by EMNEs will be 
positively related to the shareholding of the largest shareholder. 
                                                          
5 See the review by Young et al. (2008) and the discussion below. 
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However, the possibility for controlling shareholders to reap the beneﬁts of private 
control is central to PP conﬂicts. The largest shareholder, having assumed effective 
control of a ﬁrm, can exploit its insider position and discretionary power to extract 
private beneﬁts that are detrimental to other shareholders and corporate performance. 
This might be destructive to the market value of ﬁrms (La Porta et al., 1999; Morck et 
al., 1988; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). Typically through 
pyramidal ownership and cross-holdings, largest shareholders as the controlling 
shareholders can gain further control rights that exceed their cash ﬂow rights. This 
allows them to use minimal capital investment to expropriate minority principals. 
Such expropriation may take many forms, such as cronyism, transfer pricing, related-
party transactions, asset stripping, tunnelling proﬁts etc. (Faccio, Lang, & Young, 
2010; La Porta et al., 1999; Liu & Lu, 2007). 
 
Previous research suggests that ﬁrms with multiple blockholders have higher ﬁrm 
values than those with a single dominant one (Laeven & Levine, 2008; Maury & 
Pajuste, 2005). Firms might beneﬁt from effective cross-monitoring as multiple 
shareholders compete for corporate control and mitigate the expropriation of 
dispersed minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999; Pagano & Ro¨ ell, 1998). They 
might contest the opportunistic controlling shareholders in favour of value-
maximising investment projects, thereby curbing the diversion of corporate resources 
for private gain and demonstrating a positive effect on corporate risk-taking (Attig, 
Guedhami, & Mishra, 2008; Mishra, 2011). We thus hypothesise: 
 
H2b. The stock market reaction to cross-border acquisitions by EMNEs will be 
positively related to the combined shareholdings of large non-controlling 
shareholders. 
 
The presence of institutional shareholders as blockholders has also been suggested as 
an alternative mechanism to decrease agency costs. With the cost of divesting their 
large block of shares to both them and the ﬁrm, they have the incentives and inﬂuence 
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to improve minority shareholder protection, monitor and affect ﬁrm strategy, and push 
for transparent deals. However, this largely depends on the long or short-term 
objectives of the institutional investors, and the need to balance their diversiﬁed 
portfolios (Filatotchev & Wright, 2011; Masulis et al., 2007; Tihanyi, Johnson, 
Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003). They also provide much needed capital resources for 
EMNEs to expand internationally. The presence of institutional investors should thus 
mitigate the expropriation activities of controlling shareholders. We therefore 
hypothesise: 
 
H2c. The stock market reaction to cross-border acquisitions by EMNEs will be 
positively related to the combined shareholdings of institutional investors. 
 
2.2.2. Corporate control 
To further examine the PP conﬂict, we focus on corporate control. The market value 
of control varies depending on how minority shareholder perceive the risk of 
expropriation by the various types of controlling shareholders (such as state, founders, 
foreign investors), all of which have different strategic goals and decision-making 
behaviours (Connelly, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & Certo, 2010; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
State-owned ﬁrms are prone to expropriative behaviour due to issues related to 
ownership transparency, managerial competence, and a preference for political 
interests rather than economic gains from internationalisation (Chen & Young, 2010; 
Tihanyi & Hegarty, 2007). Firms controlled by their founders have a strong incentive 
to undertake FDI but their minority shareholders are more likely to be exposed to 
expropriation. This is because the owners tend to retain control by forming close links 
with trusted corporate insiders and are reluctant to share vital business information 
with outsiders in order to protect their contracts, property rights and socioemotional 
endowments (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; La Porta et al., 1999; Wielemaker & 
Gedajlovic, 2011). Foreign-controlled ﬁrms are likely to focus on maximizing returns 
as they tend to demand better corporate governance by means such as improving 
transparency and undertaking monitoring activities (Filatotchev, Strange, Piesse, & 
Lien, 2007). In light of the above discussion, we hypothesise that: 
10 
 
 
H3a. The stock market reaction to cross-border acquisitions by EMNEs will be lower 
if the State is the largest shareholder. 
H3b. The stock market reaction to cross-border acquisitions by EMNEs will be lower 
if the founder is the largest shareholder. 
H3c. The stock market reaction to cross-border acquisitions by EMNEs will be larger 
if a foreign investor is the largest shareholder. 
 
2.2.3. Internal control mechanisms 
China has adopted a two-tier system for listed companies, with overall direction and 
monitoring provided by a Board of Directors (BoD) and a Supervisory Board. In the 
corporate governance literature, the BoD is viewed inter alia as an important internal 
control mechanism that is intended to safeguard the interests of the shareholders, and 
reduce the cost of PA conﬂicts when control and ownership are separated (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The literature also emphasises the considerable inﬂuence that the 
board has on ﬁrms’ strategic decisions and general corporate performance (for 
reviews, see Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010 and Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). 
 
Three characteristics of the Board of Directors are important in this context: Board 
size, the relative independence of the Board, and CEO duality. Cross-border 
acquisitions involve a great deal of complexity both before the event and during the 
post-acquisition integration, and this imposes substantial demands upon the 
managerial capabilities of the acquiring ﬁrm. Strategic management research 
recognises that, in addition to its control function, the Board may also play an 
important resource/service and support role in the ﬁrm decision-making process, and 
the efﬁcacy with which these roles are undertaken is usually associated with the size 
of the BoD and the supervisory Board (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993). 
Furthermore, the overall size of the BoD has been shown to inﬂuence the quality of 
monitoring (Yermack, 1996), though the beneﬁts may be offset in part by increased 
costs of communication (Priem, 1990; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). Board 
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independence has been found to be an indicative proxy for the quality of corporate 
governance, which is linked with general ﬁrm performance (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008)6. 
The BoD is more likely to ensure that ﬁrms’ decisions are made in the interests of all 
shareholders and thus reduce both expropriation by managers and controlling 
shareholders, if there is a large presence of outside directors (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). We assume that international 
investors will take such Board characteristics into account when assessing the 
prospects of a CM&A, and we thus hypothesise: 
 
H4a. The stock market reaction to cross-border acquisitions by EMNEs will be higher 
the larger is the size of the Board of Directors. 
H4b. The stock market reaction to cross-border acquisitions by EMNEs will be 
higher the greater the independence of the Board of Directors. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, various authors have suggested that corporate boards are 
often ineffective in EMNEs and fail to establish “institutional legitimacy” to oversee 
private interests of control. Controlling shareholders often use their voting rights to 
turn the BoD into a ‘rubber stamp’ authority by appointing board members who will 
support their decisions (Claessens et al., 2002;  Claessens et al., 2000; Peng, 2004; 
Xiao, Dahya, & Lin, 2004; Young et al., 2008). This is particularly likely in 
companies where the Chairman of the Board is also the Chief Executive (the case of 
CEO duality). Chen, Li, & Shapiro (2011) found that CEO duality had an insigniﬁcant 
impact on monitoring expropriation activities of controlling shareholders in China. 
We thus hypothesise: 
 
H4c. The stock market reaction to cross-border acquisitions by EMNEs will be lower 
in companies where the Chairman of the Board is also the Chief Executive Ofﬁcer. 
                                                          
6 In China, Board independence is deﬁned by the Chinese Security Regulation Commission (CSRC) for 
listed ﬁrms in ‘‘Guiding Opinions on Establishing the Independent Director System in Listed 
Companies 2001’’. In Article 1 of the document, an independent director refers to ‘‘a director who 
does not hold any position in the company other than director and who has no relationship with the 
listed company engaging him or its principal shareholders that could hinder his making independent 
and objective judgments.” 
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Many emerging countries have followed the OECD principles and set up supervisory 
boards to oversee senior management and the Board of Directors. It is now mandatory 
under Chinese Company Law to have supervisory boards, and also that one-third of 
the directors should be independent (Chen et al., 2011; Mar & Young, 2001)7. As with 
the BoD, the members of the Supervisory Board may in principle perform an 
important function in terms of providing strategic information and knowledge that 
ﬁrms can use in their decision-making processes (Hambrick et al., 1993). To this 
extent, we would expect the stock price reaction to be positively related to the size of 
the supervisory board. However, there is substantial research to suggest that 
supervisory boards in Chinese companies are at best likely to be ineffective, and may 
even have a negative impact upon corporate efﬁciency. Supervisory boards in China 
have no power to vote on BoD decisions nor on the selection of BoD members. Chen 
et al. (2011) thus concluded that supervisory boards had limited effectiveness in 
mitigating the expropriation activities of controlling shareholders in China. Dahya, 
Karbhari, Xiao, & Yang (2003) suggested that supervisory boards in China were 
dysfunctional, and were generally perceived as decorations to the boardroom. Ding, 
Wu, Li, & Jia (2010) found that large supervisory boards were associated with 
increased executive compensation and lower pay-performance sensitivity, thus 
suggesting lower monitoring efﬁciency. We thus hypothesise that: 
 
H4d. The stock market reaction to cross-border acquisitions by EMNEs will be lower 
the larger is the size of the Supervisory Board. 
 
In advanced countries, the audit committee is an important mechanism within the 
internal corporate governance of listed companies. The main role of the committee is 
to be the guarantor of the integrity of the company’s ﬁnancial statements, so that 
external investors and other stakeholders can have conﬁdence in the ﬁnancial data 
with which they are presented. The independence of the committee is taken to be 
assured by the presence of independent auditors. Furthermore the audit committee 
                                                          
7 The CSRC published the Code of Corporate Governance in January 2001. 
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will also submit their work to external auditors, and the latter’s remit will include 
providing assessments of the effectiveness of management’s ﬁnancial management 
and the committee’s work (Chan & Li, 2008, Chen, Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2006). Good 
independent external auditors charge high fees, especially if they are required to 
undertake a considerable amount of work. In emerging economies, both the role and 
the efﬁcacy of these auditing arrangements are less established, nevertheless we 
hypothesise that international investors will view both with favour: 
 
H4e. The stock market reaction to cross-border acquisitions by EMNEs will be higher 
the greater the independence of the audit committee. 
H4f. The stock market reaction to cross-border acquisitions by EMNEs will be higher 
the larger the fees paid to external auditors. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. The construction of the dataset 
One of the unique features of EMNEs, particularly Chinese ﬁrms, is that they often 
conduct CM&As via third countries or tax havens (Ning & Sutherland, 2012). Nearly 
70% on average of Chinese OFDI stock went to Hong Kong by 2011 and this was the 
major vehicle for Chinese ﬁrms to access global capital (MOFCOM, 2011). 
Furthermore, the Chinese government has recently proposed a set of policies to 
encourage more Chinese mainland ﬁrms to list in Hong Kong (Financial Time, 2012). 
 
We constructed a unique ﬁrm-level dataset from a combination of sources and 
manually-collected information. All bidding ﬁrms had an ‘ultimate parent’ 
(controlling shareholder) from Mainland China. These included ﬁrms incorporated in 
China and listed in Hong Kong with H-shares and mainland Chinese companies 
incorporated and listed in Hong Kong with major business operations in China (also 
known as “red chip” companies). The initial sample consisted of 405 CM&A 
announcements made between 1 Oct 1991 and 31 May 2010 by Chinese MNEs listed 
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on the HKSE. This sample information was extracted from a combination of the 
Thomson Financial database, Factiva, and news reports as there were a number of 
missing Chinese CM&A records on Thomson. We required all ﬁrms to have at least 
120 days stock trading information, and to have been listed on the HKSE for at least 
one year prior to the acquisition announcements. We obtained ﬁrms’ stock returns and 
ﬁnancial information through DataStream. After excluding companies with missing 
stock data, we identiﬁed 396 CM&As associated with 145 ﬁrms. We then excluded 
CM&As involving ‘round tripping’ activities by checking the investment destinations 
of each CM&A deal. This left a sample of 335 acquisition announcements (associated 
with 137 parents) for the cross-section regression analysis. Corporate governance 
variables were manually collected from each company’s annual reports to match the 
announcement period. Information from Chinese listed ﬁrms about major governance 
variables such as board and ownership structure has become increasingly available 
since 1999 when new disclosure regulations were introduced (Chen & Young, 2010). 
 
The use of stock price data from the ‘advanced’ HKSE has two main advantages 
compared to analysing comparable data from the domestic emerging economy (i.e. 
Chinese) stock markets. First and foremost, stock prices in emerging markets are 
often inadequate measures of ﬁrm value due to higher degrees of information 
asymmetry (Von-Eije & Wiegerinck, 2010). In contrast, the higher disclosure 
standards on the HKSE should reduce these information asymmetries, with the result 
that prices should more accurately reﬂect ﬁrm value. Second, domestic Chinese 
investors are restricted from trading H-shares or investing in Chinese ﬁrms directly 
incorporated and listed in Hong Kong. The HKSE stock prices thus reﬂect the 
expectations of international investors, who may be assumed to have many potential 
investment opportunities and moreover to have the wherewithal to make relatively 
balanced judgments of the merits of individual CM&A deals. 
3.2. Methodology 
We adopt cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on the bidding ﬁrms’ stock prices 
around the announcement date as a measure of CM&A performance. The price 
changes are used to infer investors’ reactions (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). This measure 
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has been frequently used in the previous ﬁnance and management literature, and 
particularly in the case of EMNEs where ﬁrm-level ﬁnancial and accounting data 
suffer from availability and reliability concerns (Chen & Young, 2010; Gubbi, Aulakh, 
Ray, Sarkar, & Chittoor, 2010). 
 
To test Hypothesis 1, we employ a standard event study methodology to assess the 
CAR of the Chinese acquirer ﬁrm around the event day. The event day (t = 0) is the 
CM&A announcement day. The market equation to compute the abnormal returns is 
given by: 
 
                                                 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                             (1) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡  is the stock return of bidder i at time t. 𝑅𝑚𝑡  is the return on a market 
portfolio, the HangSeng Index, during the period of t. Coefﬁcient 𝛼𝑖 is the intercept 
term and bi captures the systematic risk of the acquirer i’s stock. 𝜀𝑖 is the error term in 
the regression equation. From the estimation of Eq. (1), the daily abnormal return 
(𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) for each CM&A event i is calculated as: 
 
                                                 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼?̂? + 𝛽?̂?𝑅𝑚𝑡)                                      (2) 
 
αî  and  βî are the ordinary-least-squares parameters computed through the regression 
of Rit on Rmt in Eq. (1) over the 90 trading days, commencing from t = -120 to t = -31 
prior to the event8. These two coefﬁcients were used to predict the ‘normal’ return for 
each day during the event window and then deducted from the observed actual return 
to compute the daily  𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 in Eq. (2). The event window was a symmetric number of 
                                                          
8 A range of different estimation windows have been used in the previous literature, as Gubbi et al. 
(2010), Boateng et al. (2008), and McWilliams and Siegel (1997) have pointed out. We used a 
relatively short (i.e. from t = -120 to t = -31) period to avoid compounding effects that might 
contaminate the results and lead to more biases, as well as dilute the announcement effects in our 
estimation. In unreported results, we also re-estimated the CARs using a variety of short and longer 
(e.g. from t = -270 to t = -21) estimation windows, but our results were robust. These results are 
available on request from the authors. 
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days around the event day. This paper uses 2, 3, 5 and 11-day event windows (0, +1), 
(-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) to measure the short-term market reactions, based on the 
assumption that the Hong Kong Stock Exchange is a relatively mature and efﬁcient 
international market. The daily  𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 were aggregated over the event window period 
to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). We then checked whether 
CARs are statistically different from zero using the parametric t-test and the non-
parametric Wilcoxon-signed rank test. 
 
For Hypotheses 2–4, the resulting CARs were regressed on the sets of explanatory 
and control variables to validate the hypothesized shareholder value creation effects 
of the corporate governance variables (See Table 1 for more details). The multiple 
regression equation was thus: 
 
         𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖 +  𝛽3𝐼𝐶𝑀𝑖 +  𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖         (3) 
 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖  is the CAR of acquirer i; 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖  are the three variables related to the 
ownership structure: viz. the percentage of shares held by the largest-shareholder, the 
other blockholders (with at least 10% shareholding), and institutional investors; 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖  are three dummy variables related to the identity of the controlling 
shareholder: viz: state-controlled, foreign-controlled, or founder-controlled; 𝐼𝐶𝑀𝑖 are 
the six variables related to internal control mechanisms, viz: board size, board 
independence, CEO duality, the number of non-executive directors, size of 
supervisory board, audit committee independence, and audit fees; 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖  are the 
various independent control variables (see below), viz ﬁrm age, ﬁrm size, Tobin’s q, 
leverage, and the dummy variables group afﬁliation, public target, target region, and 
year effect9. 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. 
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
                                                          
9 The variables used in the robustness tests are not presented in this equation. 
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3.3. Control variables 
In line with the extant literature on CM&As, the regression analysis controls for 
various ﬁrm-speciﬁc and deal-speciﬁc variables that might affect short-term ﬁrm 
value. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables include ﬁrm age, which is normally assumed to 
have a positive impact (+) due to learning curve effects on ﬁrm performance 
(Sapienza, Autio, George, & Zahra, 2006). We control for the inﬂuence on CAR of 
the ﬁrms’ past ﬁnancial and operational performance by including the three-year 
average returns on assets (ROA) and operating proﬁt margins (OPM). Strong past 
performances are expected to have positive effects (+). Firm size may be associated 
with value creation if ﬁrms’ are able to mobilise their available resources and 
capabilities to achieve scale economies through M&As, or with value destruction 
given possible managerial hubris and information asymmetry in target assessment, 
and challenges for post-acquisition integration (Stulz, 2005). It can therefore have 
either a positive or negative effect (+/-). We include Tobin’s q as a proxy for ﬁrms’ 
capitalised capabilities and resources (Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, & Teoh, 2006; 
Doukas & Lang, 2003), though previous research shows mixed results as to its effect 
on CAR (+/-), Leverage is expected to have a positive effect (+) on CARs as higher 
debt levels reduce managerial discretion and also show ﬁrms’ capabilities to access 
ﬁnancial resources (Masulis et al., 2007). 
 
One of the main features of the corporate governance environment in emerging 
economies is the prevalence of business groups (Chang & Choi, 1988; Chang, 2006; 
Khanna & Yafeh, 2007; Young et al., 2008; Colpan et al., 2010). The potential 
beneﬁts of business group afﬁliation are well recognised and include member ﬁrms’ 
capabilities to tap the group’s capital and managerial resources, the sharing of costs 
and risks, inter-group transactions such as debt guarantees and internal trade, and the 
ability to mobilise resources more readily in the external capital market because of 
privileged access and/or reputation beneﬁts (Chakrabarti, Singh, & Mahmood, 2007). 
But business group afﬁliation also has disadvantages. Complex ownership structures –
involving inter alia stock pyramids and cross-shareholdings – are commonplace, 
particularly in Asia (Claessens et al., 2002). There may be agency problems if the 
objectives of the ﬁrm are not the same as those of the controlling group (Shleifer & 
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Vishny, 1997). Such considerations suggest that international investors may well view 
group afﬁliation (-) as exacerbating potential PP conﬂicts, and reducing the expected 
gains from CM&As. 
 
The deal-speciﬁc variables include the target ﬁrms’ public status – this affects the 
acquisition performance due to the different degree of market competition and 
political costs involved. Acquisitions of publicly-listed ﬁrms can lead to signiﬁcantly 
negative CARs, whereas positive results are more likely for private targets (Aybar & 
Ficici, 2009; Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002; Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 
2004). We therefore include a dummy variable for the public status of the target ﬁrms, 
and expect public targets to have a negative effect (-). Previous research has also 
suggested that the payment method for the acquisition may be relevant. We consider 
three possibilities: payment by cash; payment though stock transfer; and payment by a 
combination of cash and stock. We take the latter method as the ‘base’ category, and 
introduce two dummy variables to indicate whether payment for the CM&A is made 
by cash or completely through the transfer of stock. Dong et al. (2006) suggest that 
100% payment in stock (-) may indicate an overvaluation of the acquirer’s stock, and 
may thus have a negative impact upon stock price, whilst 100% payment in cash (+) 
is likely to be positively received. Conn et al. (2005) found no stock price reaction 
difference between the payment methods, but we nevertheless include the dummies to 
capture any possible effects. 
 
Finally, we also control for the impact of time-varying market-wide performance, and 
for the general effects related to the target ﬁrms’ region (Europe, North America, Asia) 
on stock performance. The governance variables and the independent control 
variables, and their hypothesised effects upon the stock price reaction, are 
summarised in Table 1. 
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3.4. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics and the correlation matrix of the variables 
used in our regression. In line with the previous literature, the average percentage of 
largest-shareholder ownership concentration in our sample is 56%. The number of 
directors on the Board is about 12 and around 31% of them are independent directors. 
Largest-shareholder ownership concentration is positively correlated with CARs. The 
majority of the correlations are less than 0.4 but to ensure the results will not be 
affected by multicollinearity, we compute variance inﬂation factors (VIFs). All VIF 
values are within an acceptable range (mean 2.63). 
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1. The stock market reaction to announcements of cross-border acquisitions 
To test hypothesis 1, we used a standard event study method to measure the effects of 
CM&A announcements on the shareholder value of the Chinese acquirer ﬁrms. Table 
3 reports the CARs for both the total sample of 396 acquisitions and the subsample of 
335 acquisitions during the 2-day, 3-day, 5-day and 11-day event windows. For the 
whole sample, the mean CARs range from 0.61% to 1.05% and are statistically 
signiﬁcant over the 2-day (p < 0.01, positive yield of 0.91%) and 3-day event 
windows (p < 0.01, positive yield of 1.05%). The mean CARs in the wider event 
windows are positive at the 10% signiﬁcance level. This is in line with our 
expectation that the HKSE is a relatively efﬁcient market. We also employed the non-
parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test to examine the signs of the CARs (McWilliams 
& Siegel, 1997). The test results are statistically signiﬁcant and can conﬁrm the 
dominance of the positive CARs for both 2-day and 3-day event windows. We also 
applied the same test procedures to our subsample and obtained the same outcome. 
 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
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The above results support Hypothesis 1 and indicate that Chinese CM&As, on 
average, generate positive abnormal returns. The international investors perceive the 
CM&As as value-creating strategies. These ﬁndings are consistent with earlier 
research for EMNEs in general (Bhagat et al., 2011; Gubbi et al., 2010), and more 
speciﬁcally for Chinese ﬁrms based on the response of the domestic stock market 
(Chen & Young, 2010; Kling & Weitzel, 2011). 
 
4.2. The determinants of the stock market returns related to corporate governance 
We now consider the impact of the governance variables on the cross-sectional 
variation in the CARs of the Chinese acquirer ﬁrms – see Table 4. We ﬁrst regressed 
the 3-day CARs on the set of independent control variables (Model 1), including a set 
of dummy variables to capture year effects and the effects of the home regions of the 
target companies. The coefﬁcient of determination was 0.137, and ﬁrm size, ﬁrm 
capabilities and resources (as proxied by Tobin’s q), ﬁnancial performance (as 
proxied by the return on assets) all have signiﬁcant negative effects upon the acquirer 
CARs. The negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on ROA indicates that international 
investors perceive large ﬁrms may have already exhausted their internal growth 
opportunities as inferred from the negative impact of ROA on CARs. These results 
are similar to the ﬁndings of Baker et al. (1988), Dong et al. (2006), Moeller et al. 
(2004) and Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz (2005). In contrast, the coefﬁcient of the 
operating performance (OPM) variable is positive and signiﬁcant, showing that 
investors view favourably acquisitions made by companies with high proﬁt margins. 
 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
We next regressed the CARs on the set of independent control together with the 
corporate ownership variables (Model 2). The inclusion of these variables let to a 
marked increase in the explanatory power of the model (R2 = 0.153).The coefﬁcient of 
the largest-shareholder (𝛽 = +0.041, p < 0.1) is signiﬁcantly positive, thus conﬁrming 
Hypothesis 2a and the propositions of Dharwadkar et al. (2000). It implies that 
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international investors perceive controlling shareholders can improve the 
effectiveness of governance, overcoming the PA issues and taking on excessive risks 
to internationalise. The presence of other large blockholders also has a positive effect  
on  the  CARs,  but  the  impact  is  statistically insigniﬁcant  (𝛽 = +0.021, p > 0.1).  
Hypothesis 2b is thus not supported. It appears as though international investors do 
not expect large non-controlling blockholders to mitigate the PP problems inherent in 
ﬁrms with concentrated shareholdings. Finally we ﬁnd a negative but insigniﬁcant 
effect associated with the share ownership of institutional investors (𝛽 = -0.037) in 
Model 2, but both the absolute size and the statistical signiﬁcance of this coefﬁcient 
increase when additional explanatory variables are added. Thus the coefﬁcient 𝛽 = -
0.101 (p < 0.05) in Model 4, contrary to our prediction in Hypothesis 2c. This implies 
that greater institutional ownership may not mitigate the expropriation by controlling 
shareholders. Coffee (1999) also shows that mutual fund shareholders in the Chinese 
listed ﬁrms do not tend to act in favour of other minority shareholders. 
 
At the next stage, we added the three variables related to the identity of the largest 
shareholder (Model 3). Again there is a marked increase in the explanatory power of 
the model (R2 = 0.172). We show that State control (𝛽 = -3.799, p < 0.01) and founder 
control (𝛽 = -4.149, p < 0.01) both have signiﬁcant negative effects upon the stock 
price reaction to CM&A announcements, conﬁrming hypotheses 3a and 3b. This 
suggests that international investors perceive State and/or founder shareholders may 
have objectives other than shareholder value maximisation, and so react accordingly. 
Previous studies have also shown that State-controlled ﬁrms may be more predisposed 
to follow their own agenda. Investors might perceive this as allowing bureaucrats to 
pursue their own social and political objectives and embark on politically symbolic 
OFDI projects at the expense of ﬁrm performance (Chen & Young, 2010; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). Stulz (2005) termed this situation “expropriation by the state”. This 
may also reﬂect the concern of international investors that Chinese MNEs with a 
governmental controlling shareholder could be caught up with political controversies 
in foreign countries or suffer from post-acquisition integration failures when they 
make CM&As. The explanation for the negative impact of corporate founders could 
be that they are more likely to make decisions without the aid of “outsiders” and 
alienate outside investors, as concluded by (Wielemaker & Gedajlovic, 2011). Firms 
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with the founder as the controlling shareholder are more likely to conceal corporate 
information from the market (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). 
 
We found that control by foreign investors had a negative but insigniﬁcant effect on 
the CARs, thus not supporting hypothesis 3c. The above results together suggest that 
although shareholders will not avoid investing in these ﬁrms, they are aware of the 
potential for expropriation by controlling shareholders such as the state and founders, 
and discount the share prices of these ﬁrms accordingly. This evidence is consistent 
with previous research (Chen et al., 2011; Peng, 2004), and provides evidence for the 
importance of avoiding potential PP conﬂicts in the value creation of CM&As. It is 
also interesting to note that group afﬁliation has a very signiﬁcant negative effect (𝛽 = 
-3.531, p < 0.1) on the CARs in Model 3. This implies that investors suspect that 
complicated group structures entrench controlling shareholders and increases the 
possibility of expropriation, thus offsetting the beneﬁts of the internal market for 
scarce resources within the group (Strange, Filatotchev, Buck, & Wright, 2009). 
 
Finally, we estimated the full model including the control variables, the ownership 
variables, the corporate control variables, and the six variables capturing different 
internal control mechanisms10. The introduction of these six ICM variables led to a 
very signiﬁcant increase in the explanatory power of the model (R2 = 0.222; F = 4.67, 
p < 0.01). The control variables all retained their previous signs and signiﬁcance, 
except that ﬁrm size lost signiﬁcance whilst the coefﬁcient of leverage became 
positive and signiﬁcant (𝛽 = 0.011, p < 0.05) as found in earlier work. None of the 
deal-speciﬁc variables were statistically signiﬁcant. Of more interest is the fact that 
the coefﬁcient of group afﬁliation was negative and highly signiﬁcant (𝛽 = -4.567, p < 
0.01) conﬁrming that investors perceive potential PP conﬂicts in ﬁrms that are 
members of business groups. The coefﬁcients of the three ownership and three 
corporate control variables all retained their previous signs and signiﬁcance. 
 
                                                          
10 Please note the sample size is only 278 due to missing data for some companies. 
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With regard to the six internal control mechanism variables, we ﬁnd that both BoD 
size (weakly) and Board independence (more strongly) have positive and signiﬁcant 
effect on the stock price reaction, lending support to hypotheses 4a and 4b. We can 
also report that the size of the Supervisory Board has a very signiﬁcant negative 
impact (𝛽 = -0.342, p < 0.01), conﬁrming hypothesis 4d, and supporting the views of 
many authors that supervisory boards may at present be more of a hindrance than a 
help to good corporate governance in Chinese listed companies. The other three 
variables (CEO duality; audit committee independence; audit fees) all had the 
expected signs, but none were statistically signiﬁcant so hypotheses 4c, 4e and 4f 
were not supported on the basis of this analysis. 
 
4.3. Robustness checks 
The analysis above was undertaken using 3-day CARs as the dependent variable. As a 
robustness check, we also estimated the regression model using the corresponding 5-
day CARs [-2, +2] and the results are reported in Table 5. The results are broadly 
similar, and indeed most models show slightly higher levels of explanatory power – 
for example, the coefﬁcient of determination in Model 4 is 0.243 (cf. 0.222 in Table 
4). This is reassuring, however none of the six internal control mechanisms are 
individually statistically signiﬁcant in this regression notwithstanding the signiﬁcant 
increase in the R2. This could be a result of the relative efﬁciency of HKSE that leads 
to a short-term signiﬁcant reaction. The results nevertheless suggest that further 
investigation of the impact of internal control mechanisms is still necessary in future 
research. 
 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
 
We also estimated the model using additional explanatory variables such as relative 
deal size, and alternative measures for some control variables. We calculated the 
relative deal size using the deal value divided by the market value of the acquirer’s 
total assets (Nicholson & Salaber, 2013). Due to missing values, our sample size is 
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reduced to 172 observations. The main results were largely unaffected11, whilst the 
related deal size variable had a negative but insigniﬁcant impact on the reported 
CARs. Further robustness checks were carried out using different measures of ﬁrm 
size, ﬁnancial and operating performance, but the results remain materially 
unchanged12. Finally we estimated the model omitting the variables related to the 
targets’ regions and deal payment methods, but again the main results were robust. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The growth in CM&As from emerging economies has been remarkable. Our 
knowledge is still limited regarding the value implications of these CM&As and the 
impact of PA and PP governance conﬂicts on the value variations, particularly how 
this relationship is perceived by international investors. This paper makes an attempt 
to study the impact of various corporate governance characteristics on the stock price 
reactions of a sample of Chinese MNEs listed or incorporated on the HKSE. 
 
As HKSE-listed Chinese ﬁrms have committed to higher governance standards by 
listing in an international market and complying with the stricter foreign disclosure 
requirements, they should beneﬁt from an enhanced information environment and 
improved transparency, thereby reducing expropriation risks. Our ﬁndings ﬁrstly 
indicate that overseas stock markets reward these ﬁrms with positive shareholder 
returns upon the announcement of cross-border takeovers. Secondly, we examined the 
effects of potential PA and PP governance conﬂicts on the variation in the MNEs’ 
stock performance following CM&As. After controlling for a range of other possible 
ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects, we found there are signiﬁcant relationships between the 
announcement returns, the ownership structure and the identities of the controlling 
share- holders. We found that international investors perceive that a high level of 
largest-shareholder ownership concentration creates value, but also raises the risk of 
expropriation of minority principals, which is particularly pronounced in state-
controlled and founder-controlled ﬁrms. International shareholders discount share 
prices as a consequence of these perceived corporate governance issues. Third, we 
                                                          
11 For brevity, the results are not reported but are available upon request. 
12 The results are available from the authors on request. 
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show that the PP and PA conﬂicts may be mitigated by a large and independence 
Board of Directors, but that supervisory boards (at least in the Chinese context) 
appear to exacerbate rather than assuage international investors’ fears of conﬂicts. 
 
Our research results have an important implication for the corporate governance 
literature in that we demonstrate how various governance variables affect the 
shareholder wealth effects of EMNEs’ internationalisation via CM&As, as perceived 
by international investors. Research rooted in agency theory suggests that effective 
corporate governance can increase shareholder returns through minimizing PA 
conﬂicts. Building on this work, we postulate that effective corporate governance can 
reduce the internal costs of aligning different stakeholders’ interests and risk 
preferences, and of coordinating organisational activities across borders. Nevertheless, 
although many EMNEs may have adopted many of the features of Anglo-American 
corporate governance, the mechanisms do not necessarily function as supposed in 
emerging economies. Their external governance mechanisms, market institutions, and 
minority shareholder protection are limited and less effective. Block shareholder 
ownership concentration becomes necessary to constrain agent discretion, improve 
ﬁrms’ risk-taking abilities and reduce the internal transaction costs derived from 
coordination among shareholders when ﬁrms are engaged in CM&As. 
 
However, this concentrated structure runs the risk of expropriation of minority equity 
principals. Given the prevalence  of concentrated ownership in EMNEs, the PP rather 
than PA conﬂicts are often overlooked as a major issue that affects the shareholder 
value creation effect of CM&As as perceived by international investors. Our results 
suggest that investment returns may be disproportionately distributed between 
controlling shareholders and minority equity investors. As international investors 
discount the share prices of EMNEs with potential PP conﬂicts, and thus increase the 
cost of capital of these EMNEs, the controlling shareholders will eventually bear 
some of the costs of the PP agency issues. 
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This paper is not without limitations. We summarize these as follows along with some 
suggestions for future research areas. Firstly, the value creation or destruction needs 
to be interpreted cautiously. Although the event study method is generally regarded as 
a reliable measure for CM&A’s market value implications, it is based on the efﬁcient 
market hypothesis that the stock market reacts instantly and completely to ﬁrms’ 
strategic decisions (Gubbi et al., 2010; Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002). We also focus on 
the value consequences from the perspective of international bidders. The degree of 
information asymmetry, complications in the ﬁrm takeover events, and the market 
knowledge of international investors could lead to some degree of heuristic bias. 
Future research might need to take into account these methodological constraints. 
Secondly, CM&As by EMNEs are a relatively new phenomena and their frequency is 
still relatively low compared the frequency of CM&As by MNES of developed 
countries. This leads to the sample size of this paper being small compared to studies 
on CM&As by developed country MNEs. Moreover, the ﬁnancial reporting practices 
of EMNEs as seen in this study have resulted in many missing variables, although 
manual collection of the data used in this paper has minimised this problem13. In the 
future this issue may be resolved as the globalisation of business progresses and the 
adoption of international business practices by EMNEs becomes widespread. Future 
studies might be in a better position to re-examine some of the governance and value 
creation issues related to CM&As, with a longer sample period and more observations. 
Cross-country studies of EMNEs’ CM&As through third countries might reveal an 
even more comprehensive picture and offer more theoretical explanations for such 
events. 
 
 
                                                          
13 For example, we would have liked to include relative deal sizes despite the fact that previous 
research (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Nicholson & Salaber, 2013) has shown that this variable may be less 
relevant for EMNEs than for developed country ﬁrms, but we have a large number of missing values. 
We have therefore not included this variable to maintain our sample size. Future research might be 
able to overcome these data restrictions when more corporate information of EMNEs becomes 
available. 
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Fig. 1. The hypothesised determinants of shareholder value creation as perceived by 
international investors. Note: Corporate governance related determinants are 
examined from the perspective of ownership structure, characteristics of control and 
internal control mechanisms and indicated in dashed lines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ownership Structure 
H2 
H1: CM&A Value 
Creation perceived by 
international investors 
Corporate 
governance 
Characteristics of Control 
H3 
H4 Internal control 
mechanisms 
37 
 
Table 1 Variable descriptions 
Variables Expected sign Description   
Dependent Variables 
      CAR (-1,+1) 
(+) 
Cumulative abnormal return of acquiring firms calculated based on the market model during the 3 days around the acquisition 
announcement 
Ownership structure 
      Largest shareholder (+) Percentage of shares held by firms’ largest shareholder with at least 10% of shares 
   Other blockholders (+) Cumulative percentage of shares held by all blockholders with at least 10% of shares, other than the largest shareholder 
    Institutional investors  (+) Cumulative percentage of shares held by institutional investors (%) 
 
 
 
Ownership Characteristics 
 
 
    State controlled  (-) Dummy variable: 1 for the state being the largest shareholder, 0 otherwise 
    Foreign controlled  (+) Dummy variable: 1 for the foreign investor being the largest shareholder, 0 otherwise 
    Corporate founder controlled  (-) Dummy varible:1 for the corporate founder being the largest shareholder, 0 otherwise 
Board structure 
      Board size  (+) Number of directors on bidders' board 
    Board independence  (+) Ratio of independent outside directors (%)  
    CEO/chairman duality  (-) Dummy variable: 1 if the bidder CEO is also chairman of the board, 0 otherwise. 
    Size of supervisory board  (-) Number of supervisors 
    Audit committee independence  (+) Ratio of independent auditors on the audit committee (%) 
    Audit fees  (+) Log of the amount of fees paid to auditing firms 
 
 
 
Control Variables 
 
 
    Firm age   (+) Year of incorporation to year of acquisition  
    Firm Size  (+/-) Log of total assets at the end of last fiscal year before acquisition 
    Tobin's q  (+/-) Market value of assets over book value of assets 
    Leverage (+) Percentage of total debt over total equity (%) 
    ROA (+) 3 year average return on assets (%) 
    OPM (+) 3 year average operating profit margin (%) 
    Group affiliation (-) Dummy variable: 1 for group affiliated,  0 otherwise 
    Public target  (-) Dummy variable: 1 for public target firms, 0 otherwise 
    Targeted regions (×) Dummy variable for each  different regions in Europe,  North America, Asia 
    Year effect (×) Dummy variable for each year in the sample period 
    Stock payment (+/-) Dummy variable: 1 for stock payment, 0 otherwise 
    Cash payment (+/-) Dummy variable: 1 for cash payment, 0 otherwise 
  Note: Firm size in millions and audit fee is in thousands of Yuan. general control variables used in the regression equation. 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
    Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 CAR (-1,+1) 1.11 7.94 1                                
2 State controlled 0.78 0.41 0.02 1                   
3 Foreign controlled 0.04 0.21 0.02 -0.42 1                 
4 Corporate founder controlled 0.08 0.27 -0.02 -0.55 0.28 1               
5 Largest shareholder 56.44 16.69 0.06 0.25 -0.29 -0.28 1             
6 Other blockholders 4.04 8.76 -0.06 -0.19 0.07 0.29 -0.50 1           
7 Institutional Investors  7.78 18.68 -0.07 -0.54 0.03 -0.05 -0.03 0.15 1         
8 Board size 11.45 2.93 -0.01 0.10 -0.06 -0.25 -0.05 -0.16 0.01 1       
9 Board independence  31.15 11.35 0.08 -0.04 0.17 0.17 -0.03 0.04 0.02 -0.46 1     
10 CEO/Chairman Duality 0.23 0.42 -0.04 -0.01 0.18 0.12 -0.26 0.23 -0.05 -0.11 0.30 1   
11 Audit fees 21,311.75 37,217.56 -0.05 0.16 -0.21 -0.19 0.34 -0.23 -0.03 0.39 -0.08 0.11 1 
12 Size of supervisory board 2.86 3.58 -0.10 0.16 -0.02 -0.12 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 0.35 -0.03 -0.07 0.56 
13 Audit committee independence 85.51 22.54 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.21 -0.04 -0.19 -0.19 0.21 0.09 0.05 
14 Group affiliation 0.94 0.24 -0.02 -0.04 -0.15 0.02 0.45 -0.36 -0.22 0.08 -0.12 -0.15 0.25 
15 Firm age 13.75 12.07 -0.12 -0.21 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 0.28 0.14 -0.18 -0.16 -0.14 
16 Firm Size  419,000 1,470,000 -0.09 0.09 -0.25 -0.29 0.28 -0.27 0.17 0.46 -0.06 0.06 0.83 
17 Leverage 66.12 82.94 0.02 -0.17 -0.09 -0.10 -0.13 -0.08 0.32 0.19 -0.10 -0.13 0.04 
18 Tobin’s q 1.38 4.05 0.00 -0.18 0.47 0.31 -0.07 0.13 -0.03 -0.15 0.08 0.09 -0.18 
19 OPM 11.88 36.61 -0.01 0.14 -0.37 -0.04 0.16 -0.03 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.16 0.29 
20 ROA 7.18 9.54 -0.14 0.21 -0.41 -0.09 -0.01 0.22 -0.09 -0.05 0.16 0.35 0.27 
21 Public target 0.4 0.49 -0.10 0.06 -0.14 -0.09 -0.02 0.04 0.08 0.14 -0.12 -0.07 0.06 
22 stock payment 0.03 0.16 0.14 -0.03 -0.02 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.03 -0.13 0.07 0.03 -0.09 
23 cash payment  0.36 0.48 -0.11 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.08 0.03 -0.04 -0.09 
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    Mean SD 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
12 Size of supervisory board 2.86 3.58 1                     
13 Audit committee independence 85.51 22.54 -0.14 1                   
14 Group affiliation 0.94 0.24 -0.09 0.19 1                 
15 Firm age 13.75 12.07 -0.22 -0.24 0.14 1               
16 Firm Size  419,000 1,470,000 0.51 -0.10 0.20 0.04 1             
17 Leverage 66.12 82.94 0.13 -0.18 0.04 0.17 0.32 1           
18 Tobin’s q 1.38 4.05 -0.01 0.05 -0.11 -0.05 -0.32 -0.12 1         
19 OPM 11.88 36.61 0.06 -0.06 0.20 -0.01 0.36 0.01 0.02 1       
20 ROA 7.18 9.54 0.08 0.05 -0.01 -0.17 0.30 -0.19 -0.27 0.58 1     
21 Public target 0.4 0.49 0.11 -0.18 -0.08 0.07 0.10 0.16 -0.09 -0.01 0.02 1   
22 stock payment 0.03 0.16 -0.08 0.07 0.03 -0.02 -0.12 -0.15 -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 -0.02 1 
23 cash payment  0.36 0.48 -0.05 -0.10 0.07 0.09 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.07 0.14 0.30 -0.08 
Notes: Firm size in millions and audit fee is in thousands of Yuan. Correlations > 0.10 in magnitude are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or higher.
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Table 3 Cumulative abnormal returns around the CM&A announcement days 
 
    
CAR Mean% Median % %positive t statistics Wilcoxon signed rank test 
Panel A Cumulative Abnormal returns (N=396) 
CAR (0,+1) 0.91 0.46 55% 2.77*** 2.52** 
CAR (-1,+1) 1.05 0.06 51% 2.67*** 1.97** 
CAR (-2,+2) 0.61 -0.23 48% 1.34* 0.53 
CAR (-5,+5) 0.84 -0.08 49% 1.31* 0.66 
Panel B Cumulative Abnormal returns (N=335) 
  CAR Mean% Median % %positive t statistics Wilcoxon signed rank test 
CAR (0,+1) 0.92 0.43 56% 2.52*** 2.41** 
CAR (-1,+1) 1.11 0.04 51% 2.55*** 1.98** 
CAR (-2,+2) 0.68 -0.22 48% 1.35* 0.69 
CAR (-5,+5) 1.11 -0.04 50% 1.58* 1.01 
      Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4 Cross-sectional regression of CARsa on corporate governance variables 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 Board size 
      
0.333* (0.184) 
Board independence  
      
0.110** (0.054) 
CEO/Chairman duality 
      
-0.167 (1.168) 
Audit fees 
      
0.756 (0.784) 
Size of supervisory board 
      
-0.342*** (0.116) 
Audit committee independence 
     
0.002 (0.016) 
State controlled 
    
-3.799*** (1.334) -4.340** (1.776) 
Foreign controlled 
    
-0.690 (1.979) -0.580 (2.190) 
Founder controlled 
    
-4.149*** (1.115) -4.232*** (1.403) 
Largest shareholder  
  
0.041** (0.020) 0.056** (0.023) 0.080** (0.035) 
Other blockholders 
  
0.021 (0.053) 0.021 (0.051) 0.075 (0.071) 
Institutional investors  
  
-0.037 (0.027) -0.088** (0.033) -0.101*** (0.040) 
Firm age -0.062 (0.038) -0.034 (0.043) -0.040 (0.046) -0.033 (0.045) 
Firm size -0.464** (0.224) -0.476** (0.223) -0.606** (0.225) -0.894 (0.592) 
Leverage 0.002 (0.004) 0.005 (0.004) 0.006 (0.003) 0.011** (0.005) 
Tobin’s q -0.226** (0.086) -0.240** (0.096) -0.251*** (0.088) -0.267** (0.109) 
Group affiliation -0.200 (0.918) -2.069* (1.163) -3.531*** (1.205) -4.567*** (1.446) 
OPM 0.030*** (0.009) 0.034*** (0.010) 0.042*** (0.010) 0.040*** (0.011) 
ROA -0.155*** (0.050) -0.170*** (0.050) -0.175*** (0.046) -0.202*** (0.061) 
Public target -0.946 (0.781) -0.956 (0.777) -0.908 (0.805) -0.602 (0.809) 
Stock Payment 5.456 (7.674) 5.856 (7.501) 6.722 (7.081) 7.369 (6.840) 
Cash Payment -0.251 (0.766) -0.079 (0.754) -0.154 (0.742) 0.260 (0.859) 
Year effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Targets' regions Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Constant 9.582*** (2.865) 8.978*** (2.563) 15.431*** (2.712) 3.03 (5.896) 
Observations 301 
 
301 
 
301 
 
278 
 R-squared 0.137 
 
0.153 
 
0.172 
 
0.222 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
   a Three-day event window. We control for the impact of time-varying market wide performance and adjust t-statistics for industry clustering across all models. 
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Table 5 Robustness check 5 day CARsa 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model  4 
 Board size 
      
0.282 (0.280) 
Board independence  
      
0.041 (0.086) 
CEO/Chairman duality 
      
0.889 (1.245) 
Audit fees 
      
1.604 (1.023) 
Size of supervisory board 
      
-0.270 (0.195) 
Audit committee independence 
      
0.002 (0.018) 
State controlled 
    
-4.647*** (1.462) -4.754** (1.940) 
Foreign controlled 
    
-1.102 (2.139) -1.233 (2.407) 
Founder controlled 
    
-8.825*** (1.752) -8.847*** (2.152) 
Largest shareholder 
  
0.075*** (0.023) 0.082*** (0.028) 0.094** (0.040) 
Other blockholders 
  
0.003 (0.055) 0.015 (0.049) 0.015 (0.071) 
Institutional investors  
  
-0.049 (0.029) -0.110*** (0.037) -0.106** (0.045) 
Firm age -0.044 (0.046) -0.001 (0.051) -0.014 (0.052) -0.008 (0.045) 
Firm size -0.677** (0.310) -0.724** (0.274) -0.986*** (0.286) -1.920* (0.980) 
Leverage -0.001 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) 0.005 (0.004) 0.012* (0.007) 
Tobin’s q -0.341*** (0.115) -0.355** (0.132) -0.326*** (0.103) -0.364*** (0.124) 
Group affiliation -0.571 (1.223) -3.865** (1.554) -4.837*** (1.542) -6.123*** (1.862) 
OPM 0.054*** (0.014) 0.057*** (0.017) 0.070*** (0.015) 0.069*** (0.017) 
ROA -0.249*** (0.084) -0.261*** (0.089) -0.281*** (0.076) -0.291*** (0.104) 
Public target -0.546 (0.961) -0.538 (0.939) -0.513 (0.982) -0.840 (1.081) 
Stock payment 0.739 (7.140) 1.380 (7.249) 3.035 (7.463) 3.604 (7.130) 
Cashpayment 0.155 (0.989) 0.488 (1.010) 0.344 (0.994) 0.748 (1.146) 
Year effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Targets’ regions Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Constant -5.675 (7.004) -9.182 (6.249) 1.444 (7.655) 20.264** (7.913) 
Observations 300 
 
300 
 
300 
 
277 
 R-squared 0.134 
 
0.162 
 
0.200 
 
0.243 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
     a Five-day event window. We control for the impact of time-varying market wide performance and adjust t-statistics for industry clustering across all models. 
 
